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The article critically reviews the existing literature on genocide and mass violence and divides it ac-
cording to different levels of analysis: macro, meso, and micro levels. We discuss the main theories
and ﬁndings at each level of analysis and suggest avenues for further research. We argue that the
literature on genocide should pay more attention to meso and micro levels of analysis. We also iden-
tify a number of other research problems, including conceptualization, selection bias, case compar-
ability, the role of restraint, the question of change over time, and the need to engage in dialogue
with the broader social science scholarship on political violence and intrastate conﬂict.
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As a growing ﬁeld of inquiry, the comparative study of genocide is more robust than
ever; yet major problems and obstacles remain. Begun in the late 1970s and 1980s with
seminal works by Leo Kuper, Helen Fein, Israel Charny, and Irving Louis Horowitz,2
the area of study remained relatively marginal to mainstream social sciences and history
until the mid to late 1990s. Thereafter, the onset of cases in Central Africa and Eastern
Europe, which drew widespread attention in policy and academic domains, stimulated
major new interest from scholars. The net impact is substantial progress on a number
of fronts, in particular broader comparative analysis, more sophisticated methods of
comparison, and a raft of new and exciting theories, particularly at the macro level.
Yet a number of important problems continue to plague the ﬁeld of study: concep-
tual disagreement (which in turn limits consensus on the universe of relevant cases), a
tendency toward selection bias (with reliance on “positive” cases—i.e., cases where
genocide occurred—rather than a focus on variation in outcomes, thus avoiding com-
parisons between situations where genocide occurred and those in which it did not),
unit heterogeneity (the cases under comparison are quite diverse), an unhealthy aca-
demic cloistering (in particular, a lack of dialogue with kin literature on political vio-
lence), and a theoretical focus on invariant or slowly changing variables measured at
the society and state levels of analysis.3 Most of these factors, we argue, substantially
limit the ﬁeld’s ability to move forward and successfully address new research questions
and agendas. In addition, we argue that meso-level analysis remains underdeveloped in
the ﬁeld of genocide studies and that micro-level analysis would gain from more atten-
tion to variation and to greater cross-case comparison.
Consistent with the mandate of this special issue of Genocide Studies and Preven-
tion, our main purpose is to critically review the existing literature and suggest avenues
for future research. In our case, the exclusive focus is on literature on the causes of geno-
cide (and mass killing) and its dynamics, with a particular emphasis on comparative
analysis.4 There is no easy way to neatly divide and classify this literature, which is
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interdisciplinary, diverse, and increasingly deep. Rather than clustering the literature
into “generations,” as one of us has done elsewhere,5 we borrow from the literature on
civil war and choose to divide the literature according to different levels of analysis:
namely macro, meso, and micro levels. A crucial caveat is in order: any short, critical,
and broad-gauged analysis of the existing literature can do justice neither to the com-
plexity and nuance of many authors’ arguments nor to the breadth of research. The
review is necessarily incomplete. Even so, we aim to provide a useful guide to the exist-
ing literature and to suggest areas of improvement for future work.
Macro-Level Research
In the interest of simplicity, we divide the macro-level literature into six major streams
of argumentation about (1) intergroup relations, (2) regime type, (3) hardship and
upheaval, (4) ideology, (5) leaders’ strategy, and (6) modernity and development. Some
theories cross these boundaries; some theories are multicausal. Yet, in the main, these
different theoretical emphases provide a starting point for categorizing the existing
macro-level literature on the origins of genocide.
The central claim made by scholars who stress intergroup relations is that the deep
origins of genocide are fractious relations between groups in a society. For Kuper, “di-
vided” societies in which populations disliked and distrusted each other are necessary
conditions for the occurrence of genocide.6 For Fein, the idea that dominant groups in
particular contexts deﬁne subordinate groups “outside the universe of obligation” is
central to her explanation.7 More recently, Daniel Goldhagen has asserted that wide-
spread eliminationist hatred is the root of genocide.8 Similarly, John Hagan and
Wenona Rymond-Richmond stress racism in their recent book on Darfur.9 There are a
number of causal mechanisms in this strand of literature. The main ones concern
hatred, antipathy, and distrust on the part of a segment of the population toward
another segment of the population. Dehumanization is another commonly stipulated
mechanism. For large segments of a population to acquiesce to or support genocide,
they must either be indifferent to or want the destruction of other segments.
The central claim made by scholars who stress regime type is that authoritarianism
facilitates radicalization and the use of violence. The causal claims are present in two
seminal works by Rudolph Rummel and Horowitz.10 They receive more contemporary
empirical support in Barbara Harff ’s quantitative research as well as that of Kristine
Eck and Lisa Hultman (though Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino’s quantitative ﬁnd-
ings as well as those of Matthew Krain do not support a relationship between regime
type and large-scale destruction).11 Although sometimes submerged in scholarship, the
regime type literature posits two main mechanisms. On the one hand, the absence of
democratic constraints in authoritarian states depresses opposition and thereby facili-
tates the escalation of extremism. On the other hand, the regular use of repression in an
authoritarian system regularizes and normalizes the use of violence by states.
The central claim made by those scholars who stress hardship and upheaval is that
certain factors create conditions within populations that in turn trigger violence and sca-
pegoating toward other populations. As Ervin Staub and Peter Uvin have found, the
central hypothesized mechanism in the literature is frustration-aggression, whereby dep-
rivation or structural violence create anger and disappointment which are then chan-
neled into aggression toward other populations.12 A related claim is that instability and
upheaval (war, revolution, coups, or regime changes) create uncertainty and dislocation,
which too can be directed toward out-groups. Harff argues that national upheaval is a
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key facilitating condition that interacts with pre-existing social cleavages which are po-
larized in crisis.13
Ideological arguments are diverse, but at the base the claim is that leader-level
goals and ideational frameworks shape the policy choice of genocide. Scholars highlight
different ideological content. Eric Weitz emphasizes commitments to utopia based on
race and nation; Michael Mann emphasizes commitments to ethnic nationalism and
perversions of democratic ideals; Ben Kiernan argues that ideological commitments
to racism, agrarianism, expansionism, and the cult of antiquity are consistent themes
across time in genocide cases; Jacques Semelin emphasizes commitments to purity in
times of crisis.14 In some contrast to scholars who locate the origins of genocide in
social or intergroup relations, scholars who emphasize ideology conceptualize the pro-
cess leading to genocide as top-down. Some scholars also argue that ideology shapes
processes of escalation and how leaders respond to contingency and constraints in
times of crisis.15
Strategic arguments are similarly diverse, and similarly top-down, but the central
claim is that leaders choose genocide for instrumental purposes to solve problems and
achieve major goals. Ben Valentino’s work is the most explicit, but other political scien-
tists, such as Chip Gagnon, argue that politicians choose nationalism and persecution
for instrumental purposes.16 Manus Midlarsky argues that the choice of genocide is ex-
ercised to protect state interests, emerging from realpolitik—political and strategic con-
siderations rather than ideological ones—but he argues that the decision is imprudent
and disproportionate.17 A related claim is that genocide and war have a strong causal
connection. This claim is made, among others, by Martin Shaw; Valentino, Paul Huth,
and Dylan Balch-Lyndsay and Ulfelder and Valentino argue that mass killing most
likely emerges in the context of guerrilla civil war.18
Finally, a number of scholars link the destruction of civilian populations to under-
lying processes of modernization, development, and interstate competition. The claims
are found in Zygmunt Bauman’s seminal work on the Holocaust and more recently in
Weitz, Mann, and Mark Levene’s comparative research.19
While not comprehensive, these six streams of argumentation reﬂect the diversity,
heterogeneity, and sophistication of comparative research on genocide and related
forms of mass killing. In the past decade in particular, macro-level research and theori-
zation has expanded signiﬁcantly. In comparison to research at the meso and micro
levels, macro-level research is explicitly comparative; it is often cross-national and cross-
temporal. While a number of problems continue to limit the coherence of the ﬁeld (as
discussed below and perhaps as would be expected given the interdisciplinary nature of
the ﬁeld and the complexity of the phenomenon), we underline here that much of the
dynamism in the literature on the origins of genocide in recent years has occurred at the
macro level. This makes sense. Because genocide is usually a top-down process, in
which national states are initiators and authorizers of mass violence, theorizing causa-
tion at the macro level is a natural ﬁt for genocide studies. At the same time, the dyna-
mism at the macro level should not overshadow important research agendas at the
meso and micro levels. As the article argues, theorizing all three levels should be part of
a comprehensive agenda for studies of genocide and similar forms of mass violence.
Meso-Level Research
What is the meso level? At the broadest level, the meso level is the space between
national- or international-level factors and individual-level ones. More speciﬁcally,
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meso-level studies typically focus on subnational regions and communities (provinces,
towns, and villages) or on speciﬁc institutions (such as political parties, civil society or-
ganizations, economic sectors, social or political networks, or military units). Compared
to macro- and micro-level research, meso-level analysis is the least developed among
the three prongs of genocide research, and the ﬁeld of genocide studies would beneﬁt
from greater attention to this level of analysis.
The meso level is crucial for several reasons. First, local-level actors are often criti-
cal in how genocide occurs. Local actors transmit and sometimes initiate policies to
commit violence, identify and sort victims, and frequently are key perpetrators of actual
killing. Coordination between macro-level and meso-level actors is an essential part of
the process of genocide. As Bloxham argues, mass murders “are organized, in the sense
that the actions of perpetrators are concerted and systematic. An organizational struc-
ture usually emerges—however rudimentary or temporary.”20 Meso-level actors are
essential to that process. Second, meso-level actors shape the process of violence, in par-
ticular in more decentralized states. In highly centralized and coercive states, meso-level
actors might enjoy comparatively little autonomy in substantially changing or altering
the trajectory of mass violence. But in other circumstances meso-level actors have
greater independence. Their actions in turn can shape, amplify, and inhibit agency and
victimization.21 Third, by looking carefully at the meso level, scholars can develop a ri-
cher understanding of the dynamics of violence and generate evidence by which to eval-
uate competing hypotheses. Fourth, studying meso-level institutions will yield insight
into variation into how and why violence unfolds at different levels or in different ways,
as the civil war literature has recently demonstrated.22 Pioneered by Stathis Kalyvas and
Elisabeth Wood, a focus on local dynamics has been a central innovation in the litera-
ture on violence in civil war.23 In particular, Kalyvas argues that the national and the
local level should be disarticulated and that the dynamics at the local level are often not
derivative of the broader or “master” cleavages at the national level.
To be sure, the meso level has not been completely overlooked by scholars, in par-
ticular scholars of the Holocaust. Our understanding of the Holocaust has been vastly
improved by classic community studies (such as Jan Gross’s Neighbors), studies of Ein-
satzgruppen and various Nazi institutions, and recent works, such as Christopher
Browning’s Remembering Survival and Barbara Engelking and Jacek Leociak’s monu-
mental study of the Warsaw ghetto.24 Often authored by historians, the principal goals
of these studies were to describe what happened in these communities.
But some recent work on Eastern Europe in the 1940s has been undertaken with
more explicit explanatory and theoretical objectives. One innovative study focuses on
the summer of 1941 when numerous Jews were murdered not by the Nazis but by their
non-Jewish neighbors. These pogroms and collective killings were not formally part of
the Nazi-initiated genocide. But by studying variation in where the violence occurred,
Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg develop a rich argument about how the outburst,
or the lack thereof, of anti-Jewish violence is related to pre-existing patterns of politics
and modes of intercommunal relations between the Jewish minority and their non-
Jewish neighbors. According to their ﬁndings,
[in places] where Jews supported ethnic parties that advocated minority cultural auton-
omy, the local populations perceived the Jews as an obstacle to the creation of a nation-
state in which minorities acknowledged the right of the titular majority to impose
its culture across a country’s entire territory. These communities became toxic. Where
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determined state elites could politically integrate minorities, pogroms were far less likely
to occur.25
Their ﬁndings echo a similar study by Diana Dumitru and Carter Johnson, which
focuses on variation in the levels of violence against Jews during World War II.26
Subnational variation has been broached in studies of other cases, in particular the
1994 genocide in Rwanda but also violence in Bosnia.27 In Rwanda, there is observed
variation with respect to when violence started in different communities and in the
composition of the local actors driving the genocide. Several scholars have designed stu-
dies at the subnational level to focus on the variation in patterns of violence, whether at
the commune (district) or secteur (sector) levels.28 Those studies have yielded insights
into how the process of violence unfolded in Rwanda and have also allowed for a more
empirically rich assessment of competing hypotheses that would explain the dynamics
of genocide in Rwanda.
A major recent meso-level study on the Rwandan Genocide is Timothy Longman’s
analysis of churches. By carefully examining one institution, Longman’s study provides
a rich understanding of the social dynamics and the processes by which violence un-
folded and was legitimized. Longman argues that not only were mainstream Christian
churches complicit in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 but their actions facilitated and
sometimes encouraged the mass violence. He argues that the churches’ embrace of eth-
nic politics and subservience created fertile ground for the execution of genocide. Long-
man also conducts a comparative study of the dynamics of genocide in two parishes. In
one parish, local actors worked with the state before and during the genocide, singling
out Tutsi, labeling them as the accomplices of insurgents, and, ﬁnally, murdering them.
In the other, the dominant local actors and many common villagers resisted the state’s
murderous policies. Rwanda is a highly centralized state, and at the end of the day the
Tutsi of this parish were also slaughtered. But through his comparison, he effectively
illustrates the dynamics of violence and shows that there were important attempts to
resist the genocide.29
Another recent study by Yang Su focuses on rural China during the Cultural Revo-
lution. In that case, as many as three million people labeled “class enemies” were bru-
tally murdered by their neighbors in collective killings and “struggle rallies.” This
happened even though the central government had not issued any mass killing orders
or policies. Drawing on the social movements literature, and viewing collective killing
as an extreme form of collective action, Su proposes a community model to explain
why and how a community mobilizes to kill its members. Su also points to and seeks to
explain subnational variation in victimization rates. Su’s community model considers
ﬁve related processes to be crucial for collective killing to take place. The ﬁrst concerns
collective ethnic categorization, which is shaped by the community’s history, tradition,
and culture. The second process generates potential victims in the community, and the
third process generates potential killers in the community. The fourth process is the de-
mobilization of legal constraints in the community, while the ﬁfth process is the demo-
bilization of moral constraints and the framing of the situation in terms that make
killing possible. However, while some processes—such as scapegoating of so-called class
enemies, mass mobilization of the population, and ﬁerce competition between party fac-
tions and cadres—affected the state as a whole, in the bloodiest provinces of Guangdong
and Guangxi these national-level dynamics were superimposed on and interacted with
distinctively local factors, such as a unique history of Chinese migration to these areas,
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patterns of local clan conﬂicts and village level politics, and the strategic location of the
provinces. The outcome was mass killing and only the combination of national and
local factors can explain why in Guangdong and Guangxi the killing rates were substan-
tially higher than in the rest of the country.30
Finally, the interplay between national- and local-level factors is a theme in Geof-
frey Robinson’s recent study of East Timor. Robinson, a historian and member of the
UN’s political team in East Timor in 1999, does not simply see the conﬂict in dichoto-
mous terms between the Indonesian government, on one hand, and the East Timorese,
on the other. He argues that the violence has roots in conﬂicts between different groups
of East Timorese as well as in the patterns of governance and warfare of the Portuguese
colonial administration. The Indonesian political and military elite based in Jakarta, ar-
gues Robinson, turned to a strategy of mass murder when challenged but could not
carry out massacres and terror without local militia. The latter, in turn, were often
driven by local factors, histories, and traditions which in many cases predated and were
unrelated to the master cleavage of independence from or integration with Indonesia.31
Although the meso-level study of genocide or other forms of mass violence remains
underdeveloped vis-à-vis other areas of research, our brief consideration here shows
how valuable these studies are. Meso-level research from various corners of the world
brings into focus key institutions, patterns of interaction before mass violence starts, and
detailed attention to how the dynamics of violence unfold. In some cases, as in Poland
and China, meso-level factors substantially explain variation in outcomes. But in all the
cases, an explicit focus on meso-level factors generates a fuller, richer picture of the pro-
cess of violence and allows for grounded theorization into the causal dynamics at hand.
Micro-Level Research
Why do individuals participate in mass violence against civilians? Why do individuals
harm others with whom they have no prior individual conﬂict or who are not engaged
in conﬂict? The question is a perennial and critical concern for scholars of genocide and
mass violence. In recent years, the topic has received a systematic review from psycholo-
gist James Waller.32 There also has been a series of studies on Rwanda as well as an
ethnographic study on Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.33 From a comparative per-
spective, two main weaknesses of micro-level research are (1) the relative absence—with
some exceptions—of systematic comparison across cases and (2) an empirical focus on
the Holocaust and Rwanda. There is a paucity of systematic data at the individual level
on most other cases. A major question that remains unanswered is whether and how
agents of violence in cases of mass killing and genocide differ systematically from agents
of violence in atrocities of lower magnitude. More speciﬁcally, are there patterns of per-
petrator composition or individual-level motivation that are speciﬁc to cases of mass
killing and genocide? Once again, to answer that question, a greater engagement with
the broader literature on political violence is necessary.
There are six main methods that scholars of genocide and mass killing have used to
make observations at the individual level: (1) compiling biographies or social composi-
tion studies through court documents, newspaper coverage, and/or historical accounts
of events34; (2) in-depth interviews with selective, non-systematically sampled perpetra-
tors35; (3) close observation of particular actors36; (4) experimental designs37; (5) survey
research38; and (6) community-based studies that derive observations about individual-
level motivations. It is hard to prescribe any one method. Scholars choose their research
methods depending on the questions that they are asking and the data available.
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Theories of why individuals participate in mass violence abound and can perhaps
be productively synthesized into eight main categories of argumentation. There are
claims about (1) psychological predisposition, such as sadism, to commit violence39; (2)
deprivation and frustration and in particular the idea that hardship causes stress that is
channeled into violence40; (3) identity, in particular the idea that individuals harbor out-
group antipathy or in-group solidarity which would lead them to harm others41; (4)
ideological conviction and commitment42; (5) legitimacy—perpetrators commit violence
because of their obedience to or vertical relationships with superiors43; (6) collective and
horizontal peer pressure44; (7) fear and insecurity45; and (8) selective and material incen-
tives—the idea that individuals commit violence to gain power or property.46
Are there any cumulative ﬁndings in this theoretically diverse literature? To our
minds, there are at least two consistent ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that the perpetrators of
atrocities are “normal”—that is, they often reﬂect a demographic cross-section of their
societies. There is nothing a priori that would have predisposed the average perpetrator
to commit violence. The agents of violence do not appear, on average, to have any pre-
existing, demonstrated psychological abnormality or predisposition to deviance; they do
not seem on average to be especially poor; and they have common levels of education.
Demographically, they tend to be representative of their societies. The theme is recur-
rent across some of the most inﬂuential micro-level studies, from Waller to Arendt,
Browning, and Goldhagen.47 This is not to say that some professions are not especially
represented in certain aspects of genocide, such as a scientiﬁc community in conceiving
and implementing the Final Solution.48
A second ﬁnding concerns heterogeneity at the micro level. A number of scholars
who study individual-level behavior conclude that there are multiple dynamics of moti-
vation. Some individuals might have multiple reasons to participate in violence. Others
might participate at one point in time for one reason but continue at another point in
time for another reason—that is, motivation changes over time. Finally, genocides and
other instances of mass killing are complex social and political phenomena in which
often thousands of perpetrators take part; no single theory is likely to explain each per-
petrator’s motivation. Thus, heterogeneity, complexity, and mutability all characterize
the ﬁndings about perpetrators of mass killing and other forms of extreme violence.49
Future Research
In this section we summarize the main achievements and shortcomings of scholarship
at each level of analysis and then suggest new questions and agendas for further
research. For a ﬁeld dominated by macro-level studies, the most fundamental gains have
been in understanding which factors lead to genocide; under which conditions leaders
turn to mass killings; and how ideologies, emotions, and beliefs contribute to the emer-
gence of genocidal policies. However, despite numerous and quite substantial gains,
macro-level scholarship on genocide suffers from several important shortcomings.
First, conceptual disagreements limit the ability to generate cumulative ﬁndings. In
particular, scholars both maintain different deﬁnitions of genocide and use different
terms to talk about it. Rummel analyzes “democides,” Harff discusses “politicides” (and
genocides), and Mann focuses on “murderous ethnic cleansing.” Valentino examines
mass killings of 50,000 victims over the course of ﬁve years, while Shaw argues that the
actual number of people murdered matters less than the intention “to shatter and break
up” the community’s social existence; one should not confuse ends with means and out-
comes, he contends.50 Some scholars, such as Christian Gerlach, question the theoretical
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usefulness of the concept of genocide.51 Achieving scholarly consensus on the concept
of genocide or whether genocide should be the unique focus of study (as opposed to
another term or a broader category) is probably unlikely. Certainly, debate and dis-
agreement are productive for scholarship. However, as long as there remain core and
vigorous disagreements about the main concept that unites a ﬁeld of study, the ability
to make theoretical generalizations about causes will be constrained. At best, scholars
working in the ﬁeld must remain attentive to the conceptual differences that shape it.
Second, macro-level qualitative comparative scholarship on genocide, with some
minor and notable exceptions,52 is characterized by insufﬁcient attention to variation.
The main question in the ﬁeld is, What do X cases of genocide have in common? In
contrast, there is comparatively little macro-level research that seeks to build on existing
ﬁndings and theory to explain why some cases result in genocide while others do not.
Many theories suffer from what we call a “frequency mismatch” in the sense that the ex-
planations point to conditions that are much more common than the phenomenon of
genocide is. In short, there is a critical need for more attention to negative cases—“dogs
that did not bark”—that did not result in genocide, which in fact are the norm. Geno-
cide is a comparatively rare outcome.
A third and related shortcoming is that scholarship pays insufﬁcient attention to
temporal factors. A number of studies point to a dynamic of escalation, or “cumulative
radicalization,” as central to the process that leads to genocide.53 Some studies point to
the importance of stages of genocide or to the idea that genocides are “ﬁnal” solutions.54
These studies strongly imply that the steps taken in the planning and execution of geno-
cide are not automatic; rather, they constitute a process. Thus, there are several critical
but underexplored comparative questions: What explains escalation? Why do key deci-
sion makers choose to escalate rather than de-escalate? Are there commonalities across
cases that seem different in negative cases? These questions imply a strong need for the
temporal disaggregation of cases. But, with some notable exceptions,55 these types of
temporal, disaggregated questions are rarely asked in a comparative context. The
absence is all the more surprising given that the majority of comparative research is
qualitative, small N research whose hallmark should be process tracing.
Three ﬁnal related concerns at the macro level are (1) insufﬁcient attention to is-
sues of restraint, (2) problems of unit heterogeneity, and (3) an unhealthy division from
studies of political violence.
With regard to the ﬁrst issue, much of the existing macro-level literature focuses on
those conditions that would prompt leaders and societies to commit genocide.56 But if
the operative question becomes why does genocide occur in some locations and at some
times but not in other locations or at other times, an equally important question asks
what prompts leaders to avoid or moderate the use of mass violence.57
The issue of unit heterogeneity is the idea that the cases being compared are empir-
ically quite different. The Armenian Genocide, Rwanda, and the Holocaust are three of
the common cases of comparison in the comparative literature on genocide. Yet in
terms of the historical period, region, territory, economy, demographic structure, and
even the nature of the violence, these cases differ dramatically. To continue to build
theory, tighter comparisons that hold more variables constant will be important.
Finally, the study of genocide should not be cloistered from studies of political
violence or violence in civil war. At base, studies of genocide share a great amount of
substantive overlap with studies of other forms of violence—riots, assassinations,
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massacres, the targeting of civilians in war,58 counterinsurgency, general strategy—yet
there is little intellectual interaction between these obviously related areas of inquiry.
Again, a key issue concerns isolating and explaining the speciﬁcity of genocide by em-
bedding the analysis in the study of kin phenomena.
We have argued that meso-level research is the least developed branch of genocide
scholarship, but meso-level single-country and comparative research is a promising
emerging research area. Concentrating on the meso level, where national-level policies
and decisions translate into individual actions on the ground, will provide the ﬁeld with
a better understanding of causal chains and mechanisms. In other words, the meso level
is an essential link between the macro and micro levels, without which our ability to
analyze genocides will be signiﬁcantly restrained.
Furthermore, meso-level research has the ability to overcome some problems asso-
ciated with macro-level scholarship. First, meso-level research often explicitly incorpo-
rates variation into the research design. In particular, for community-based research,
the question is, What explains variation in outcomes across different regions and com-
munities? Second, the analysis of subnational units creates greater possibilities for large
N statistical analysis, which in genocide studies is often constrained either by unit heter-
ogeneity or by a small number of cases. Third, subnational meso-level comparative ana-
lysis holds national-level factors constant, and in so doing meso-level analysis lends
itself to identifying factors that independently cause variation.
Yet, there are important limitations to meso-level analysis. First, it cannot explain
why, when, and under which conditions genocide takes place. Meso-level research
should not treat genocides as only or mainly local and should not underestimate the
role of macro-level factors, namely state policies and actions. At the end of the day,
genocide most often is top-down.59 Second, it is still unclear how to differentiate local
violence during genocide from instances of local violence that are not genocidal in
nature, such as ethnic riots, pogroms, or localized massacres. At the same time, by con-
centrating on local factors and conditions and by comparing different units, institu-
tions, regions, and communities, future meso-level research can play a key role in
bridging macro- and micro-level scholarship and improving our understanding of how,
why, and under which conditions a government’s vague and often murky orders of
extermination are translated into actual killings on the ground.
Micro-level research will likely remain an area of continued attention. Many ana-
lysts want to understand and explain how ordinary people commit terrible acts of atroc-
ity. What then are some avenues for future research to strengthen this area of analysis?
Studies of genocide perpetrators often do not provide systematic explanations of varia-
tion among potential perpetrators. Why do some individuals participate in mass vio-
lence while others do not? Micro-level research often does not consider the whole
spectrum of potential behavioral strategies and does not explain what accounts for the
adoption of each strategy. Furthermore, as noted above, two cases now empirically
dominate the literature—the Holocaust and Rwanda (the former much more than the
latter)—and there is relatively little systematic comparison across countries and time
periods. Finally, we note the relative absence of new insights from the social psychology
literature and the relative absence of contemporary experimental design in the study of
genocide.60
To summarize, we envision further research that applies both qualitative and quan-
titative methods, is embedded in the broader political violence literature, pays sufﬁcient
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attention to and seeks to explain variation in outcomes, concentrates on identifying
causal mechanisms and tracing causal chains, and combines different levels of analysis
with particular attention to developing meso-level analysis. These changes will continue
to help advance research on the origins and dynamics of genocide and mass killing
while putting the ﬁeld in closer methodological and theoretical conversation with
related areas of research in the social sciences and history.
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